Berlin and Pettit: Can their accounts of liberalism be sustained when c

Laws have the capacity to infringe civil liberties however they also provide a forum for its creation and development. For Berlin, his conception of liberty is based upon the idea of positive and negative freedoms. Liberty according to Berlin is viewed as freedom from interference therefore laws which keep our freedoms ar preferable as they cede for different paths of self-actualization. Pettit however considers liberty in terms of freedom from domination and considers the role laws and democracy tolerate play in assuring individual freedoms. In addition to considering the respective approaches of Berlin and Pettit, their theories will also be considered in relation to terrorism. By considering their respective arguments in the context of terrorism, it becomes important to conceptualize laws not in terms of those which respect or interfere with our freedom, but rather how they are able to balance the competing interests of security and individual freedoms. Considering an Approp riate FrameworkThere are a variety of traditions which examine the relationship between the rule of law and freedom, which include Berlins positive and negative liberty, democracyan Liberalism and concept of freedom as a Triadic relationship . Historically, liberalism has been viewed as an attempt to limit state power to preserve individual freedoms however this remains an oversimplification of liberal thought. Whilst liberal rights can be understood as the freedom to pursue individual interests, they are best considered the product of a strong liberal state and the rule of law. Therefore, when considering laws which respect or interfere with our freedoms, it may be problematic to consider them in terms of simple binaries as different laws affect... ...ewsletter of PEGS, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 9, 16-17. Pettit, P. 1993, The Ideal of a Republic, The Newsletter of PEGS, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. pp. 9, 16-17. Putterman, T. 2006, Berlins Two Concepts of Liberty A Reassessment and Revision, Pol ity, vol. 38, no. 3, pp. 416-446. Riley, J. 2001, Interpreting Berlins Liberalism, The American Political Science Review, vol. 95, no. 2, pp. pp. 283-295. Sigler, J.A. 1966, The Political ism of C. Wright Mills, Science & Society, vol. 30, no. 1, pp. pp. 32-49. Stillman, R. 2003, Too Much Negative Liberty? Too Little Positive Liberty? (Or Why Berlins Idea All Depends on Its Cultural Context), Administrative Theory & Praxis, vol. 25, no. 4, pp. pp. 581-583. Zedner, L. 2005, Securing Liberty in the Face of Terror Reflections from Criminal Justice, Journal of Law and Society, vol. 32, no. 4, pp. pp. 507-533.